

# Challenges and Opportunities of the Taliban in the Process of State Building in Afghanistan: Post-American Departures

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## Article Info

### Article History

Accepted : 24-12-2024

Approved: 25-12-2024

Published: 05-01-2025

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### Keywords:

State Building

Taliban

Afghanistan

Immara

Challenge

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## Abstract

**Abstract:** The withdrawal of United States troops in 2020 marked the end of the 20-year War on Terror, triggering a quick takeover of Kabul by the Taliban. This article analyzes the potential and challenges in the process of "state-building" in Afghanistan under Taliban rule, which includes the establishment of political, social, economic systems, as well as national identity. Economic dependence on foreigners and the Taliban's status as a terrorist group were the main obstacles, while people's desire to improve their living standards and support for the Islamic political system, Imarah Islam Afghanistan (IIA), were the main drivers. A qualitative approach through literature review and in-depth interviews was used for this research. Findings show that the Taliban's classification as terrorists limits global support, although the IIA offers an institutional alternative. Domestic and global obstacles are expected to test the sustainability of the Taliban regime in building a stable state.

**Abstrak:** Penarikan pasukan Amerika Serikat pada 2020 menandai berakhirnya 20 tahun Perang Melawan Teror, memicu pengambilalihan cepat Kabul oleh Taliban. Artikel ini menganalisis potensi dan tantangan dalam proses "pembangunan negara" di Afghanistan di bawah pemerintahan Taliban, yang mencakup pembentukan sistem politik, sosial, ekonomi, serta identitas nasional. Ketergantungan ekonomi pada pihak asing dan status Taliban sebagai kelompok teroris menjadi hambatan utama, sementara keinginan masyarakat untuk memperbaiki standar hidup dan dukungan terhadap sistem politik Islam, Imarah Islam Afghanistan (IIA), menjadi pendorong utama. Pendekatan kualitatif melalui studi literatur dan wawancara mendalam digunakan untuk penelitian ini. Temuan menunjukkan bahwa klasifikasi Taliban sebagai teroris membatasi dukungan global, meskipun IIA menawarkan alternatif kelembagaan. Hambatan domestik dan global diperkirakan akan menguji keberlanjutan rezim Taliban dalam membangun negara yang stabil.

## Introduction

Kabul was swiftly captured by the Taliban following the withdrawal of American forces, which occurred concurrently with the 20th anniversary of the American-led War on Terror and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan. Diverse viewpoints exist regarding the factors that led to the lack of success in the Afghan peace negotiations between 2018 and 2021. It is crucial to acknowledge that there is no religious division that separates the Taliban from the Afghan community. Within this particular framework, moral viewpoints that differ significantly engage in a noteworthy manner, giving rise to a newly emerging and evolving dynamic. The Taliban manipulate susceptible individuals in their quest for religious legitimacy, while the Afghan government, although often failing to meet expectations, continuously opposes the Taliban ([Abdul, 2022](#)).

The deployment of a United States armed forces in Afghanistan in 2001 shattered aspirations for a tranquil future. The United States overlooked important variables, such as the structural organization of tribal networks and the historical trajectory of the country ([Boni, 2021](#)). Furthermore, the United States required assistance in undertaking the task of adopting responsibility for nation-building endeavours. The remarkable aspect was the refusal to acknowledge the diversity of Islam as a religious belief system, instead erroneously linking it only to terrorism. As a result, this tactic played a significant role in the Taliban's notable comeback.

This article analyses the impact of religion on the process of establishing a government in Afghanistan, with a specific emphasis on how minority groups and women are included. These groups have received extensive media coverage and have become a top focus for the diplomatic community. In Afghanistan context, state-building refers to the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones. State capacity is the term used to describe a state's capability to effectively carry out different policies, or, as Charles Tilly defines it, its capacity to create income. The ratio of tax income to GDP quantifies the ability of the state to collect resources from its economy ([Scalettaris, 2020](#)).

Understanding Afghanistan's past is crucial for grasping the challenges involved in the process of state-building since 2001. Throughout most of its contemporary era, the diverse nation consisting of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmens, and Aimars has faced persistent political instability and frequent changes in power through violent means ([Alemi et al., 2023](#)). Additionally, the country has heavily depended on external sources of income such as tribute, subsidies, or foreign aid to support its endeavours in establishing a functioning state. Nevertheless, there is still potential for enhancing state-building results, namely through the establishment of efficient state institutions to extend equitable public services. The persistence of patronage politics, the creation of alternative institutions mirroring those of the government, and the prioritization of immediate objectives by the government played a role in the disregard for the necessity of a stronger state capacity. A significant amount of scholarly literature has been dedicated to examining the process of establishing a functional Afghan state, focusing on the various economic, political, and cultural prospects involved. As a result, the Taliban's establishment of the Islamic emirate of

Afghanistan is the main topic of this article. Why do many international communities doubt the Taliban's success in state-building and the possibility that the Afghan people can accept the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as a new system of government?

### Research Method

The research method used in this paper is a descriptive qualitative method that involves analyzing and interpreting the qualitative data collected. It involved gathering primarily qualitative information about Afghanistan's politics, economy, and religious beliefs as well as liberal values used to criticize the Afghan's government under Taliban. Utilizing data that has already been gathered by other researchers or for non-research objectives is known as secondary data. This process includes official statistics, administrative records, and other archive items. The main focal points of data collection in this study revolve around three fundamental themes: 1. The History of Taliban; 2. The possibility of Ijarah Islam Afghanistan (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) as an government system; and 3.

The incorporation of Islamic ideas in the Afghanistan's government. Employing secondary data provides a cost-effective approach to accessing this material, which may be easily obtained through technologies like the internet. The research has used academic journal articles, textbooks, eBooks, and social media sites like YouTube and Instagram to access crucial information and data, which has then undergone data reduction, data display, and data verification. The research procedure involved leveraging resources such as Google Scholar and Science Direct, as well as other relevant databases pertaining to the topic of public diplomacy and soft power. The paper's theoretical claims are substantiated by primary data obtained from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and its internal adversary, the Northern Alliance (NA), alternatively referred to as the United National Front. The NA was in charge of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) during the 1990s.

The data was gathered from the official publications and statutes of the IEA and the Government of Afghanistan, which are stored in the Afghanistan Information Center located at Kabul University. The empirical findings of this study demonstrate that while experiencing significant institutional fragility, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is fundamentally a war-based entity, essentially functioning as a structure focused on engaging in warfare. However, despite its expertise in warfare, the IEA was incapable of militarily eradicating its internal adversaries. Therefore, although the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan achieved success in internal warfare, the IIA failed to establish a functioning state at the most basic level. Consequently, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was unsuccessful in establishing itself as the exclusive authority with the right to exercise force in Afghanistan. It also lacked the capacity to safeguard its supporters and acquire the essential resources for governing. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's institutional fragility and functional deficiencies stem from its predominant focus and allocation of resources towards warfare, the insurgent nature of its organizational structure, and its limited access to resources.

## Results and Discussion

### Taliban and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

This session focuses on the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and examines its institutional and functional aspects through the lens of country studies. After capturing Kabul in September 1996, the Taliban established a two-track government system: a political-military leadership council called the Supreme Council in Kandahar, and an executive bureau called the Council of Ministers in Kabul. The Supreme Council represents the Taliban as an insurgent group, while the Council of Ministers reflects the group's efforts to transform into a state structure. This paper addresses two interrelated questions: What is the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan like, and how does it function? Furthermore, taking into account the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's overall reliance on military means for state-building, this paper asks why the Taliban decided to rely essentially on 'war-making' as a 'state-building' strategy. Is it a choice or a default situation? In historical records, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a government that relies on violent methods of state formation as a result of the civil war and is related to the nature of the Taliban as a rebel group. Based on the theory of state formation, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's institutions can be traced from formation, structure, personality, and territory, measuring its functional aspects with three variables: legitimacy, authority, and capacity. Even though the Taliban were able to seize territory, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan ultimately failed to produce an orderly government and state system (Dobbins, 2008). The failure was in all aspects of statehood. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IIA) needs more internal and external legitimacy, has poor authority, and cannot produce essential services. The Taliban emerged primarily as an insurgent group amid the Afghan civil war in 1994 in the southern province of Kandahar. The emergence of the Taliban, like all other war groups in Afghanistan, has internal and external causes. Internally, the group is a product of a civil war in which former mujahideen and rebel groups fought.

Following the defeat of Najibullah's government in April 1992, central authority in Afghanistan was devastated, society turned into an anarchic state of 'war of all against all,' and no authority was able to enforce its end of the 'social contract.' The anarchic environment has resulted in a political vacuum within the country and a lack of central government filled by groups such as the Taliban. Externally, the creation of the Taliban is a product of regional politics, particularly Pakistan's regional ambitions. Evidence shows that field officers of Pakistan's ISI, Pakistan Frontier Corps, and regular Pakistani armed forces personnel were directly involved in supporting the Taliban. Pakistan's primary goal in sponsoring the Taliban was to create a regime in Kabul that would benefit Islamabad and to open an economic bloc that extended into Central Asia. The Taliban first emerged as a group of 30 madrasa students in reaction to a local warlord who had kidnapped and repeatedly raped two teenage girls. In March 1994, 30 Taliban attacked the warlord's camp, freeing the girls and hanging the commander from the tank barrel. After the 'hero' incident, the Taliban crossed the border into Pakistan, where the group's numbers increased to 200 within a few months. Mobilized under the command of Mullah Mohammad Omar, these Talibs crossed the border into Afghanistan and took control of the Spinbuldak district in Kandahar province

from Hekmatyar's men in October 1994. In the next three months, the group took control of 12 of Afghanistan's 31 provinces. After this victory, the Taliban organized a meeting of around 1200 Islamic scholars in Kandahar from March 20 to April 4, 1996.

The Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omer, was entitled to this meeting as Amirul Mukminin. According to Islamic tradition, Amirul Mukminin was a political leader with legitimate religious authority over the people living in areas controlled by his followers. Obeying Amirul Mukminin is compulsory (God's command and must be carried out). Therefore, according to the Sharia, anyone who refuses the bait (oath of allegiance) to the Amirul Mukminin will be called a rebel. It would be compulsory to execute him'. Apart from giving Mullah Omer the title Amirul Mukminin, several sources claim that the meeting changed the name of Afghanistan to the 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan'. However, a review of official Taliban publications shows that the term Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was first used on October 29, 1997, a year after the Taliban captured Kabul. According to Sharia, the renaming of Afghanistan was ordered by Mullah Omer on October 13, 1997. The problem of external legitimacy is a significant characteristic of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Marquette, 2011). While internally, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan does not have broad popular support, and externally, it is a political organization that is not recognized in the international community. Internally, considering Weber's articulation of the three primary sources of legitimacy, namely traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan relies on traditional sources of legitimacy and enforces them by force. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan legitimizes its authority, in particular, on Islamic grounds.

Although the behaviour of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is also based on the traditions of authority in Afghanistan, where Pashtuns dominate the country, Islam is the primary source of legitimacy. The religious origins of the Taliban government are emphasized in official statements and documents. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan uses Islam as a source of restrictive political legitimacy to prohibit any Taliban political activities. The regime propagates that, in the presence of a pure Islamic regime, there is no need for alternative political mechanisms such as modern parties or traditional systems. In an officially published statement on Sharia, for example, Mullah Omer stated that 'with the Taliban in power, there is no need for any kind of "old grand council", Loya Jirga, or any other "third party."' The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan also believes that, with Islam as the source of government legitimacy, it does not need to resort to ethnic, tribal, or sectarian politics. At the time when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was a religious regime that enforced Sharia in the most severe sense and by force. However, despite the Taliban's claim to be ethnically tolerant, there is a lot of data and empirical evidence that shows the ethnic-based behavior of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is entirely dominated by Pashtuns, with other ethnic groups excluded from the political arena and leadership of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. For example, non-Pashtuns are primarily excluded from both governing councils of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Supreme Council, and the Council of Ministers. Of the six original members of the Supreme Council, five were Pashtuns, and only one, Maulvi Sayed

Ghiasuddin, was a Tajik from Badakhshan. Likewise, of the 17 members of the Council of Ministers in 1998, only two were non-Pashtun.<sup>64</sup> Furthermore, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan appoints provincial governors and district, town, and city administrators from the center, Kandahar or Kabul, depending on the importance of the position.

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan relies on a specific interpretation of Islamic Sharia, Deobandism, which is a subcontinental branch of Islamist ideology (Miklaucic, 2023). Deobandism follows the egalitarian Salafi model and, like all Islamic schools, seeks to imitate the life and times of the Prophet Muhammad. He rejected all forms of ijtiḥād – the use of reason to create innovations in Sharia in response to new conditions. Deobandi philosophy was founded in 1867 at the Dar ul-Ulum (Islamic Place of Study) madrasa in Deoband, India. Deobandi madrassas flourished throughout South Asia, and they were officially supported in Pakistan when President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq took over Pakistan's government in 1977. The Taliban members are students at madrasas that are primarily controlled by Pakistani Islamic parties, in particular, Jamaat Islami Pakistan (JIP), led by Qazi Hussein Ahmad, and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami Pakistan (JUIP), which is led by Maulana Fazl ul-Rahman. All the characteristics of Deobandism are found in exaggerated form among the Afghan Taliban, who are essentially foreign to Afghanistan. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's Deobandi interpretation of sharia is reflected in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's laws, policies, and procedures. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan enforces many legal decisions by the group's interpretation of sharia. To ensure that this decision was implemented in Afghanistan, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan established a religious police called Amr Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil Munkar, or General Department for the Preservation of Virtue and Elimination of Vice.

The organization had 'thousands of informants in the army, government ministries and hospitals monitoring foreigners and Western aid agencies'. Most of these informants were teenagers and recent graduates of Pakistani madrasas. They patrol the streets, ensuring that people go to the mosque at prayer time, women are covered from head to toe with burkas, and men do not shave their beards. While Islam has been a generally accepted source of political legitimacy in Afghanistan, such statements indicate a high level of disagreement and contradiction regarding the application of Islamic Sharia in the country. In addition to its poor internal legitimacy, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan needs more external legitimacy in the sense that the international community officially recognizes it as the sole source of authority in Afghanistan. In many international organizations, including the UN, ISA Rabbani represents Afghanistan. In some countries, such as the United States, the Afghan diplomatic mission was suspended; however, the ISA conveyed consular duties despite the persistent complaints of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The refusal of the international community to carry out any intention for the recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is based on three issues: violations of women's rights and human rights by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the association of the Taliban with al-Qaeda, and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's constant emphasis on resolving the Afghan problem by military means. However, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan rejected all these accusations. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has attempted to manage the Afghan government.



However, neither the US nor other Western countries have shown any serious intention to recognize the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as the sole reality of Afghanistan's sovereignty. In contrast, ISA Rabbani continuously represents Afghanistan at the UN and other international organizations. For example, ISA Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Abdullah, attended the UN General Assembly in 1997 as Afghanistan's official representative, and Rabbani represented Afghanistan at the annual conference of Non-Allied countries in South Africa in September 1998 (Brown, 2021). Only three countries, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, extended official recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and the latter immediately downgraded it (Barfield, 2012). Therefore, from its inception in September 1996 until its collapse in December 2001, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan primarily invested in diplomatic and propaganda activities to convince the international community to recognize it as the legitimate and sovereign authority in Afghanistan. Sharia broadly covers these activities. When the Taliban led Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001, this country was a failed state. Divisions between people, the intensity of foreign interference, a lack of leadership, and low economic capabilities are factors that make it difficult for the Taliban to carry out state-building (Bizhan, 2018).

### **The lack of authority**

Afghanistan, like other Middle Eastern countries, the problem of legitimacy stems from issues of authority or the right to rule. The authority of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan could be more substantial because it cannot exercise a monopoly on the use of force in Afghanistan and is also unable to provide a safe environment for its people (Ullah et al., 2020). The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is engaged in endless armed combat with its internal rivals but needs more forces to eliminate them. In other words, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is investing and concentrating heavily on 'war-making' with the aim of 'state-making.' However, he never enjoyed a war machine sufficient to eliminate his rivals and acquire the means to build a state that could protect and prosper his clients. Data and empirical evidence show that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's security forces are organized as a traditional tribal militia force, the Lashkar, rather than a regular army. It was formed as an insurgent force during the civil war in Afghanistan rather than an army structure capable of regularly responding to internal threats, controlling borders, and providing a regulated and safe space for the population living in the country.

### **The capacity of a new state**

The significance of state's function is to fight internal and external enemies and protect and secure its border areas and citizens, so the state needs 'physical strength.' 'Physical power' in the modern world, as Tilly puts it, is modern military power or armies. In other words, 'state-making' in the contemporary world requires a 'war-making' apparatus, which in the modern era is the regular army (Rodríguez, 2023). Although the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan benefits from young and fast-moving combatants who capture territory very quickly, its military structure is far from that of a regular army. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's war-making affairs are essentially carried out by traditionally organized militia forces similar to rebel militias. Therefore, it has yet to produce long-lasting

instruments of supervision and control to provide security and protection on the one hand and control the country's territory and borders on the other. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan itself has publicly acknowledged the lack of a regular army in Afghanistan and has repeatedly emphasized the need to organize its military forces as an 'Islamic army.' Pakistan is not the only country whose citizens join and support the Taliban militarily. Thousands of Arab, African, East Asian, and Central Asian Muslim jihadists fought for the Taliban. Most of those fighters were organized, equipped, and trained by al-Qaeda. The integration of al-Qaeda's Brigade 055, which includes around 2000 trained troops, into the Taliban forces is a clear example of the Taliban's dependence on foreign fighters, particularly al-Qaeda.

Service in this unit, based at Khairkhana in northern Kabul, was part of the training of militants coming to Afghanistan, and the unit also supplied the most committed and practical parts of the Taliban military. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan uses all the support it receives from foreigners in the war against the NA. He also tried to provide security by force in the areas he controlled. Compared with the chaotic situation in the country in the early 1990s, the Taliban did well in bringing order to the areas under its control. However, they enforce Sharia to create order so severely that it is not widely supported in Afghanistan. Therefore, although the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was quick in seizing territory and harsh in enforcing the law, it is difficult to predict how the situation would have developed if external forces had not overthrown the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Salt, 2018). However, given the Taliban's lack of resources to cover the costs of the war, its underdeveloped armed forces, and law enforcement, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's unfamiliarity with modern means of war and control, and the rapidly changing nature of the war in Afghanistan, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's authority is poor and limited in Afghanistan, the poor and limited authority of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has not been able to change for years. A state's capacity depends primarily on the size of its economy and its ability to acquire the means of governance or resource extraction. The smaller the pool of resources and fiscal instruments, the more complex the job of extracting resources to sustain war and other government activities. In this sense, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's capacity is greatly influenced by its tiny economy and low administrative capacity to acquire resources and provide essential services. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan spends all its revenues on 'war-making' and the elimination of its internal rival, the NA.

According to official data from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, state investment in development projects and service provision is minimal. According to the official report of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the government invested, in the 2000 fiscal year, approximately \$800,000 of internal resources to complete 766 economic reconstruction and development projects, including the reconstruction of agricultural shops, power plants, and systems, post offices and several government agencies, in Kabul and its surroundings. This report claims a \$100,000 increase in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's investments in development projects in the following year. 130 Other reports indicate the involvement of



the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in minimal development and service provision projects, such as rebuilding some public libraries and madrassas, responding to emergency needs, and reconstructing several cities. Roads and provincial government agencies (Johnson, 2006). A contemporary nation-state is expected to exhibit characteristics of impersonality, formality, and accountability. In contrast, the neo-patrimonial state is the exact opposite, characterized by uncertainty and the coexistence of conflicting official and informal regulations. In a neo-patrimonial state, the interactions between the leader or patron and their clientele are characterized by personalization and informality. The patrons are responsible and very corrupt, distributing favors to their clients in order to maintain their hold on power. In this context, institutional continuity pertains to the uninterrupted existence and functioning of state institutions, including the military and civil administration.

Aid-dependency is characterized by the circumstance where aid constitutes at least 10% of the gross national product (GNP). Without assistance, the state is unable to fulfill numerous essential functions. When help is given by using the recipient government budget or pooled financial methods, such as trust funds managed by both the recipient and donors, it is referred to as budget support in the former case and on-budget aid in the latter case. This aid is channeled through the recipient's national systems, such as procurement. The number is 12. Off-budget aid refers to the flow of aid that occurs outside the government budget and avoids the national systems. The extent to which assistance delivery should be outsourced outside the recipient state procedures is influenced by various factors, including the recipient state's vulnerability, corruption, and the donors' desire for increased influence. The varying aid programs might also be attributed to the political economics of foreign contributors. Countries that prioritize market efficiency, such as the US, the UK, and Sweden, are more inclined to delegate aid distribution to countries with inadequate governance. Thirteen Aid can be coordinated with recipient priorities even if it is managed by semi-autonomous institutions that operate independently of the government and work outside of budget regulations, but nevertheless in line with government priorities and institutions.

If Afghanistan's state institutions did not exist, then the Taliban would not have the administrative capacity to run them (Weigand, 2017). Almost all of the authorities of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan are armed mullahs who have almost no knowledge or administrative skills. Since most educated and professional Afghans have left the country during the war, the shortage of trained and skilled professionals in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is alarming. Almost all cabinet ministers, deputies, and provincial governors are mullahs with a madrasa education who act as military commanders. For example, the Minister of Health, Mullah Mohammed Abbas, served as the Taliban commander in Mazar and Herat in 1997 until he returned to his job as Minister six months later. Likewise, the Governor of State Owned Bank, Mullah Ehsanullah Ehsan, led an elite force of around 1000 Kandahari Taliban, and the Governor of Herat, Mullah Abdul Razaq, led a military offensive across the country. Additionally, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan replaced all senior Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. Bureaucrats with Pashtuns, whether they meet the requirements or not. The appointment of uneducated and inexperienced militant mullahs in

the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan created a situation where ministries stopped functioning, and provincial and district administrations turned into military bases. The absence of skilled professionals in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is evident in all government areas. For example, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's negotiating team with oil companies competing over a planned pipeline to connect Central Asian natural gas and oil to Pakistan consisted of nine mullahs and one engineer.

## Conclusion

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan emerged as a 'war-making' organization amidst the civil war in Afghanistan. It attempted to develop a regular state by eliminating its internal rivals militarily. Therefore, it was planned to create state through a campaign of 'war-making.' However, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan never acquired the meaningful institutions and instruments of war necessary for state-making. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, in this sense, is a primitive war-forming institution built from traditional tribal militia units with overlapping dual-track governing institutions at its apex. Overall, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is institutionally based on a two-track system of governance that is almost entirely concentrated and invested in war-making with failed efforts at state-making.

As such, it needs more institutions and personnel to form a state, and functionally, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan fails on all three measures of statehood, including legitimacy, authority, and capacity. The Taliban's 'state formation' campaign shows the difficulty of transforming an insurgent group into a state structure relying on physical force alone. The formation of the state shows the importance of 'political inclusion' in state-building in war-torn societies. The findings suggest that a dominant insurgent group, such as the Taliban, can capture large portions of a particular territory through war for a short time but cannot eliminate other insurgent groups completely and permanently. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's failed attempt at state formation through war-making alone affected all aspects of its statehood. As a result, reliance on 'war formation' has not resulted in state formation in the case of the Taliban.

## Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada for supporting this research.

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